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Progresos políticos en Alemania desde la unificación de 1990

Las instituciones políticas de Alemania unificada son notable similares a las de la República Federal de Alemania anterior, reflejando ajustes de menor importancia para acomodar a la población más grande más bien que realizando cambios del fundamental. El drama del unfolding de la unificación es mucho más evidente cuando una toma en el paisaje político de Alemania de la consideración, incluyendo elecciones, el clima político en el país unificado, y las ediciones que han dominado ese paisaje.

La elección de Bundestag del de diciembre 2 de 1990, era la primera elección de todo-Alemania desde 1932. La elección volvió para accionar la coalición que gobernaba del CDU/CSU y del FDP. La aplicación central la campaña era unificación. Partidos que apoyaron fuertemente la unificación anotada bien; los que eran ambivalentes u opuesta a la unificación, tal como el SPD y los verdes, se fueron mal.

Las fortunas políticas de Helmut Kohl pronto declinaron, sin embargo, en la estela de problemas con el proceso de la unificación. Desempleo de aumento en el este, y cólera en el oeste sobre un aumento del impuesto que Kohl había prometido para evitar antes de la elección 1990, causado el CDU para perder una serie de Tierra elecciones después de la unificación. Consecuentemente, en 1991 la coalición predominante perdió a su mayoría en el Bundesrat cuando el CDU perdió energía en Laender de Hesse y de Renania-Palatinado (patria de Kohl). Este desarrollo hizo más difícil para que el gobierno de Kohl gane la aprobación para las iniciativas legislativas dominantes.

El año 1994 fue apodado el "año estupendo de la elección" porque Alemania condujo aproximadamente veinte elecciones en el local, Tierra , niveles federales, y europeos, culminando en la elección nacional en octubre. En ocho Tierra las elecciones a través de 1994, el SPD se fueron mejor que el CDU. El SPD aumentó así a su mayoría en el Bundesrat. El FDP se realizó desgraciadamente en Tierra nivele, no pudiendo ganar los 5 por ciento requeridos para la representación en las ocho elecciones. Dado esta demostración pobre, pregunta de muchos observadores la energía que permanece del FDP como fuerza política en Alemania. Los observadores fueron sorprendidos por la fuerza de los comunistas anteriores (PDS) en el del este Laender ; los cinco nuevos Laender elecciones celebradas en 1994, con el PDS garnering a partir 16 a 23 por ciento del voto en cada uno. El PDS aumentó su parte del voto sobre los resultados en 1990 y solidificó la posición del partido como la tercera fuerza política más fuerte en Alemania del este. De noviembre el 9 de 1994, alemanes celebró el quinto aniversario de la caída de la pared de Berlín. Sin embargo, mucho todavía divide del este y los alemanes occidentales, no menos éxito económico, y el PDS podían capitalizar en resentimientos del este.

Los alemanes votaron en elecciones nacionales de octubre el 16 de 1994. A Rudolf Scharping, el presidente desafió al canciller Kohl del ministro del occidental Tierra de Renania-Palatinado y del presidente del SPD. Los temas de la elección incluyeron el desempleo y el desarrollo económico, particularmente en la luz de la unificación, tan bien como ley y orden. A excepción del futuro del EU, las ediciones de política extranjera no calcularon en la campaña lectoral.

Scharping comenzó 1994 con un plomo fuerte en las encuestas de la opinión pública, pero, comenzando en último abril, la ayuda del SPD comenzó una declinación sostenida por varias razones. Primero, el CDU benefició de una perspectiva económica cada vez más positiva en Alemania. En segundo lugar, Scharping fue visto por muchos para ser un candidato deslustrado; además, él no era enteramente acertado en retratarse como el conciliador que había traído armonía a un SPD tradicionalmente díscolo. Vieron al canciller Kohl, sin embargo, para incorporar estabilidad, continuidad y previsibilidad; uno de sus lemas de la elección no era "ningún experimento." Tercero, el CDU/CSU lanzó una campaña feroz contra el PDS, que miembros habían pertenecido al SED comunista, llamándolo los "fascistas rojo-pintados," y Kohl tenido éxito en la incriminación del SPD, por lo menos marginal, en este renacimiento comunista que se parecía. El SPD proveió de Kohl esta oportunidad formando un gobierno de la minoría con los verdes en el del este Tierra de Sajonia-Anhalt eso dependió de los votos (o de la abstención) del PDS para permanecer en oficina. Esta táctica de CDU/CSU estuvo dirigido, él se parecería con eficacia, en esos votantes alemanes occidentales que, a pesar de Scharping, preguntaron la comisión del SPD a las políticas del centrista.

La coalición que gobernaba de Kohl demandó una victoria estrecha; redujeron a su mayoría en el Bundestag a partir 134 a diez asientos. Los verdes y los comunistas anteriores también ganaron la representación en el Bundestag. El Republikaner lejos-derecho, visto como fuerza política gastada, falló al claro el cañizo de 5 por ciento necesario para entrar en el Bundestag. El séquito del votante, encima de levemente de la elección 1990, era 79.1 por ciento. Después de la elección, Scharping sintió bien al líder del grupo parlamentario del SPD en el Bundestag, que permitirá que él mantenga un alto perfil nacional la preparación para la elección nacional siguiente. El gobierno de la coalición de CDU de Kohl, del CSU, y del FDP se centrará en crear trabajos, ajustando la burocracia, el crimen que lucha, y ampliar el EU hacia el este.

La inhabilidad aparentemente crónica del FDP de ganar la representación adentro Tierra los parlamentos significan que es cada vez más perdidoso sus bases regionales y sus depósitos del talento político futuro. Si y cómo el FDP puede regenerar el restos de la ayuda que se verá. Las insinuaciónes recientes de CDU a los verdes -- hasta hace poco tiempo un desarrollo increíble -- también sugieren un conocimiento de CDU de la necesidad posible de un socio alterno de la coalición en el futuro. La elección 1994 puede marcar así el principio de algunos cambios profundos en alineaciones políticas en Alemania.

La elección en segundo lugar nacional de Alemania unificada sugiere que el país east-west se divide no ha enangostado. La evidencia más fuerte es el éxito del PDS en ganar la representación parlamentaria. En Alemania del este, el PDS recibió 19.2 por ciento del voto, comparados con solamente 0.9 por ciento en el oeste. La cuenta nacional de 4.4 por ciento era escasa al claro el cañizo de 5 por ciento para la representación parlamentaria, pero al PDS beneficiado de una ley electoral oft-olvidada que califica automáticamente un partido para la representación según su parte total del voto nacional cuando el partido gana tres districtos electorales francamente (los primeros votos). The PDS surprised seemingly everyone in winning four districts outright (all in eastern Berlin), entitling it to thirty seats in the Bundestag.

The future of the PDS is unclear and may well depend on whether the CDU and the SPD develop programs that attract current PDS constituents. Kohl's coalition lost twice as many votes in the east as in the west, winning 49.9 percent of the vote in the west and 42.5 percent in the east. The SPD faces the challenge in the east of competing against two other parties of the left, the PDS and the Greens. When considering the success of the PDS, however, one must recall that 80 percent of eastern Germans did not vote for the former Communists. At present, PDS leaders are working to rid the party of its Stalinist heritage; if successful, the PDS would certainly have a broader appeal.

As of mid-1995, right-wing extremist parties held seats in three of sixteen Tierra parliaments (Baden-Wuertemberg, Bremen, and Schleswig-Holstein) and appeared to be fading from the German political landscape. The most significant of these parties, the Republikaner, with about 23,000 members, attracted support principally by criticizing a government policy that allowed hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers into Germany. However, the Kohl government engineered a revision of the German constitution in 1992 that severely restricts the right to asylum (which had been the most liberal in Europe), thus largely calming public concerns. The far right has thereby lost its major platform and has been tainted by violent attacks against foreigners in Germany. In-fighting has also divided the party and resulted in the ouster of leader Franz Schoenhuber, a former Waffen-SS member and the party's one nationally known figure. In the October 1994 election, with close to 80 percent voter turnout, the Republikaner received only 1.9 percent of the national vote, thus once again failing to win representation in the Bundestag. This outcome cemented a downward trend, which had been evinced in the European Parliament election and Tierra elections throughout the year. That downward trend is particularly notable in light of the fact that extreme right parties have met with considerable electoral success in several West European countries, such as France, Belgium, and Italy.

A plethora of controversial issues has marked political debate in united Germany, for example, the right to political asylum, the upsurge in right-wing violence, and the tensions surrounding the unification process itself. The Basic Law originally contained a liberal regulation on the right to asylum, and in 1992 a total of 438,191 asylum-seekers streamed into Germany--up from 256,112 in 1991. Most asylum-seekers were from Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Many Germans complained that the German law permitted many people who were not political refugees, but rather economic migrants, to take advantage of the country's generous welfare system and compete with Germans for scarce housing. Extreme right-wing parties capitalized on this widespread resentment against asylum-seekers in April 1992 elections in two western Laender.

On December 6, 1992, Kohl's governing coalition and the opposition Social Democrats agreed on a constitutional amendment to limit the right to asylum. The asylum compromise between the government and the opposition included several important changes. First, asylum-seekers from European Community states or states that accept the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the European Human Rights Convention have no right to asylum in Germany.. Second, any refugee passing through "safe third countries," which include all of Germany's neighbors, is ineligible for asylum. An individual may appeal this decision but may not stay in Germany during the course of that appeal. In exchange for these concessions, the Social Democrats won agreements to place an annual limit of 200,000 on the immigration of ethnic Germans eligible for automatic German citizenship and to ease the terms of citizenship for longtime foreign residents of Germany. Parliament approved the new asylum law in late May 1993, and it took effect on July 1. About 10,000 protesters surrounded the Bundestag on the day of the vote, but apparently about 70 percent of Germans approved the more restrictive asylum law. The number of foreigners seeking asylum in Germany has fallen substantially since the new law went into effect.

Another pressing issue has been the escalation of right-wing violence. In 1992 right-wing extremists committed 2,584 acts of violence in Germany, an increase of 74 percent from 1991. Seventeen people were killed in the 1992 attacks, six in 1991. About 60 percent of the attacks occurred in western Germany and 40 percent in eastern Germany--home to only 20 percent of the population. About 90 percent of the right-wing attacks in 1992 were directed against foreigners--above all, at asylum-seekers and their lodgings. People under the age of twenty-one committed 70 percent of these attacks.

In November 1992, three Turkish residents were killed in a firebombing in Moelln in western Germany. Of the 80 million people living in Germany in 1993, about 1.8 million were Turks, making that ethnic group the country's largest minority. Two-thirds of those Turks had lived in Germany at least a decade. The overwhelming majority of Germans condemn xenophobia and neo-Nazism, and after the Moelln attack, over 3 million Germans demonstrated across the country against right-wing violence. Following the violence in Moelln, the government began a crackdown on far-right violence. The federal prosecutor took over for the first time the investigation of an antiforeigner attack. The decision was made to charge the perpetrators with murder, rather than manslaughter, as had been done following previous arson attacks leading to fatalities. In December 1993, a judge imposed maximum sentences on the two men convicted in the Molln killings. Other measures taken by the government included banning four small neo-Nazi organizations and outlawing the sale, manufacture, and distribution of the music of several neo-Nazi rock bands.

Despite the government's actions, the number of right-wing attacks increased in the first six months of 1993. The most serious incident occurred on May 29, 1993, when right-wing youths firebombed a house in Solingen in western Germany, killing five Turks. In late December 1993, four right-wing youths were charged with murder in the Solingen attack. In late October 1993, United States citizens for the first time became the target of right-wing violence. Two skinheads harassed African-American members of the United States Olympic luge team, which was practicing at an eastern German training center. When a white luger intervened on his teammates' behalf, he was severely beaten by the skinheads.

By the end of 1993, the surge in right-wing violence appeared to be abating. The federal police reported that, in the first eleven months of 1993, rightist crime dropped by 28 percent compared with the same period in 1992. As of December 2, 1993, eight people had died in rightist violence compared with seventeen in 1992. A police spokesman stated that the decline reflected decisive executive action, including faster police responses, tougher sentences, and bans on neo-Nazi groups.

Much of the public debate on how to address the causes of right-wing violence has focused on how better to integrate foreigners into German society. Chancellor Kohl announced some steps to make it easier for foreigners to become German citizens. He stopped short, however, of advocating dual citizenship. Concern exists in law enforcement circles that neo-Nazis are building an underground network of small, organized cells patterned in part on those of the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion--RAF), the far-left organization that carried out bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings in the 1970s and 1980s. The establishment of such a network would make it much more difficult for the authorities to monitor neo-Nazi activities.

A final issue dominating Germany's political scene has been the ongoing challenge of implementing unification. Among other things, the two Germanys have had to enact uniform legislation, decide on what city should serve as their capital, and bring the former leaders of East Germany to justice.

Unification left Germany with a population possessing widely different views on matters such as the family, religion, and the work ethic. A particularly sensitive issue has been abortion. East Germany, which permitted free abortion on demand up to the twelfth week of pregnancy, had a markedly more liberal policy on abortion than did West Germany. In June 1992, the Bundestag, in an attempt to unify abortion policy, approved an abortion law--opposed by Chancellor Kohl--that granted a woman the right to an abortion up to the twelfth week of pregnancy, provided she accepted counseling first. Thirty-two of the 268 CDU legislators, primarily from eastern Germany, broke ranks with the party leadership and approved the bill.

On August 4, 1992, the Federal Constitutional Court issued an injunction against the parliament's decision, and abortion continued to be available on demand in the east and largely prohibited in the west, pending a final court judgment. On May 28, 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court struck down the compromise law on the basis of the Basic Law's explicit protection of the rights of the unborn child. The ruling held that abortion was no longer a criminal offense but that abortions would only be allowed in the first three months of pregnancy for women who first participated in a formal consultation process. Further, the ruling barred insurance funds from paying for abortions and Tierra hospitals from performing them. The ruling went into effect on June 16, 1993. Women's groups, opposition politicians from the west, and easterners from across the political spectrum expressed outrage at the court's decision. At some point in the future, the Bundestag is still expected to pass a uniform abortion law for the entire country.

Another question that arose with unification was where to locate the new German capital. The Bundestag voted in June 1991 to move the capital from Bonn to Berlin, fulfilling a long-standing promise of West German politicians across the board. The vote in favor of Berlin was surprisingly narrow, with 338 legislators supporting Berlin and 320 supporting Bonn. Many of the parliamentarians who voted for Bonn spoke of the symbolic importance of the capital's geographical location, with Bonn bearing witness to the critical importance of the Atlantic Alliance and Germany's commitment to Western democracy. Many who supported Berlin saw their choice as a necessary act of conciliation toward eastern Germans and a necessary step toward Germany's return to the world stage as a "normal" nation.

The quick move to Berlin that many eastern Germans had hoped for was thwarted by a quiet, yet effective, campaign led by Bonn bureaucrats and certain key politicians who opposed the Bundestag decision on several grounds. First, members of this group cited the huge expense of moving the government, estimated at just under US$19 billion by the Ministry of Finance. Second, they argued that Berlin's historical associations as the capital of a united Germany were negative and that Germany should avoid doing something to suggest to its neighbors a return to expansionist or aggressive tendencies. Third, many officials balked at the personal inconvenience of moving to Berlin if they owned homes in the Bonn area or otherwise faced having to uproot their families from the rather provincial Rhineland and relocate in a booming metropolis.

After two years of indecision, the Kohl cabinet announced in October 1993 that the government would complete the move to Berlin by December 31, 2000; the move will begin in 1998. The opposition Social Democrats had threatened to make the government's reluctance to move an issue in the 1994 national election campaign. Foreign embassies and private companies had delayed their moves to Berlin while waiting for an official announcement of a timetable. The cabinet decision sent a decisive message to investors and property developers who believed the move would attract greater investment in the five eastern Laender. The Bonn lobby won certain important concessions as well: eight government ministries will keep their headquarters in Bonn, and the remainder will retain offices there. Kohl received sharp criticism about the distant deadline from some commentators, who argued that the government's hesitation to complete the move was impeding the social and psychological unification of east and west.

Many Germans see the prosecution of former East German officials as a necessary part of coming to terms with divided Germany's past. On November 12, 1992, a trial opened in Berlin involving six defendants, including former East German leader Erich Honecker, former minister of state security Erich Mielke, and former prime minister Willi Stoph. These men were put on trial for the killings of East Germans trying to cross the border to the west. Two days later, however, Mielke and Stoph were declared unfit to stand trial for health reasons. Charges were then dropped against Honecker because of his advanced cancer, and he was allowed to join his family in Chile in early 1993. The remaining three defendants--all former members of East Germany's National Defense Council--were convicted in September 1993, receiving prison sentences ranging from four-and-one-half years to seven-and-one-half years.

From the start, the legal basis for the trials was questionable. German law does not apply to acts committed by East German citizens in a state that no longer exists. Thus, the defendants had to be prosecuted for transgressions of East German law, and East Germany's border law allowed guards to shoot anyone trying to flee. The Berlin prosecutors argued that the law was evil and ought not to have been obeyed, a form of reasoning with which the judges agreed. Many legal scholars believe that the convictions could be reversed on appeal, however. In part, the prosecution of these former East German leaders grew out of public indignation over the trials of border guards while senior policy makers were going free. By late 1993, ten border guards had stood trial. Nine received short, suspended sentences or acquittals; one received a sentence of six years for having shot and killed a fugitive who had already been caught and was under arrest. In the fall of 1993, the Bundestag extended the statute of limitations by three years for minor crimes by former East German officials and by five years for more serious crimes.

Most observers of Germany believe the country will solve the economic and political challenges associated with the unification process. However, polls indicated that, as time passed, eastern and western Germans seemed to see the gap between them widening rather than narrowing. In an April 1993 poll, when asked whether eastern and western Germans felt solidarity or antagonism toward one another, 71 percent in the west and 85 percent in the east answered "antagonism." In the coming years, perhaps the greatest challenge to Germans of the east and west will be to master the task of achieving social harmony. Only then can they become one nation.

  • Geografia (tierras y capitales, clima)
  • Sociedad (poblacion, religion, union, urbanizacion, estructura social, inmigracion)
  • Educacion (elemental, menor, mayor, vocacional, mas alto)
  • Economia (el milagro economico, el sistema financiero, el Bundesbank, la cultura) del negocio
  • Politica (gobierno, el canciller, el presidente, partidos, Bundestag)
  • Medioses de comunicacion (periodicos, radio y TV)
  • Fuerzas Armadas (ejercito, marina de guerra, fuerzas aereas, policia)

 

 

 

 

   
 
 

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